Evaluation of Adversarial Training on Different Types of Neural Networks
  in Deep Learning-based IDSs by Khamis, Rana Abou & Matrawy, Ashraf
Evaluation of Adversarial Training on Different Types of Neural
Networks in Deep Learning-based IDSs
Rana Abou Khamis and Ashraf Matrawy
School of Information Technology
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
{rana.aboukhamis,ashraf.matrawy}@carleton.ca
Abstract— Network security applications, including intrusion
detection systems of deep neural networks, are increasing
rapidly to make detection task of anomaly activities more
accurate and robust. With the rapid increase of using DNN and
the volume of data traveling through systems, different growing
types of adversarial attacks to defeat them create a severe
challenge. In this paper, we focus on investigating the effective-
ness of different evasion attacks and how to train a resilience
deep learning-based IDS using different Neural networks, e.g.,
convolutional neural networks (CNN) and recurrent neural
networks (RNN). We use the min-max approach to formulate
the problem of training robust IDS against adversarial examples
using two benchmark datasets. Our experiments on different
deep learning algorithms and different benchmark datasets
demonstrate that defense using an adversarial training-based
min-max approach improves the robustness against the five
well-known adversarial attack methods.
Keywords: Deep Learning-based Intrusion Detection, ad-
versarial samples, adversarial learning, RNN, CNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
DNN are increasingly used in security applications such
as network intrusion detection systems (IDS) [1] [2]. The
fact that IDS is adversarial in nature, makes security aspects
of DNN increasingly important and a critical design goal,
especially against adversarial samples. While deep learning-
based IDS aim to be very effective in classification between
benign and malign inputs, adversarial samples often expose
blind spots in the inputs. Researches on adversarial machine
learning concentrate on two main points: how to generate
capable adversarial samples that can deceive a model with
small perturbation and how to build and defense a model
to be robust against adversarial samples. The protection and
robustness against adversarial attacks is a growing challenge
and should always be addressed by DNN researchers and
designers. Several works have studied adversarial attacks for
DNN in image classification and after reviewing the literature
in the field of adversarial attack against deep learning-
based IDS [1] [2], to the best of our knowledge, it is still
the early stages and there is a lack in the current studies
demonstrated optimization and robustness of deep learning-
based IDS. This served as a motivation to explore in-depth
deep learning-based IDS and focus on different algorithms
of deep neural networks, including CNN and RNN, on
different benchmark datasets and study the effectiveness of
different adversarial attack methods against DNN and their
robustness. In this work, we use min-max approach [3] [4]
as extension of [2]. AbouKhamis et. al [2] applied min-
max in deep learning-based IDS focusing on one type of
deep neural network: Feed-Forward Neural network using
one benchmark dataset and three adversarial attack methods
based on gradient method: FGSM, Bit Gradient Ascent
(BGA) and Bit Coordinate Ascent(BCA) [4]. While in this
work, our main contributions are demonstrating that the min-
max problem is manifestly beneficial in different type of
DNN. This leads to focusing on the following:
• We work on both sides: attack and defense IDS-based
deep learning using different DNN algorithms: ANN,
CNN, and RNN by utilizing resilient deep learning-
based IDS framework based on min-max approach [2]
to generate a powerful adversarial sample and augment
them during training time.
• We use five well-known adversarial attacks, including
a simple one-step attack such as Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM), to more powerful attacks with multi-
step like BIM, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Car-
lini and Wagner (CW) and Deepfool. Those attacks are
used to solve the inner maximization problem in the
min-max formulation.
• Build six adversarial-free deep learning-based IDS with
three different architecture: ANN, CNN, and RNN on
two benchmark datasets: UNSW-NB 15 and NSD-KDD
as baseline IDS models using two pre-processing meth-
ods: Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) and Principal
Component Analysis (PCA).
• We retrained thirty adversarial IDS models to investigate
the min-max approach in more detail.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. In sec-
tion II, we provide a background of adversarial samples and
thread model. In Section III, we present a literature review of
some related work in deep learning-based Intrusion detection.
In Section IV, We explorer our methodology including the
IDS framework and algorithm. The experimental results and
evaluation are given in Section V and VI. Section VII briefly
summarize this paper.
II. ADVERSARIAL THREAT MODEL AND ATTACKS
In this work, we have a classification problem where the
DNN algorithm goal is to learn the Decision boundary to be
able to classify input data into two classes: attack (positive)
or benign (negative).
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A. Adversarial Threat Model
The fact that the training of DNN is based on data,
classification tasks can be carefully manipulated by crafted,
and perturbations inputs called adversarial samples that are
often visually imperceptible to mislead a model toward incor-
rect classification and evade detection reliably. Adversarial
attacks can attempt to attack data or models in a way to
make the decision boundary between the regular and the
crafted data shift and inaccurate. Steps for adding noise to
the original sample are illustrated in Fig 1. By using inner-
maximizer approach [2], the adversarial attack can defeat
classifiers by adding a calculated perturbation γ to legitimate
samples x to create a new version x∗ called ”Adversarial
Sample” that maximize the loss
To harden the IDS models, the proposed IDS framework
[2] incorporates the adversarial samples generated by the
maximization formula in [2] during training time. This can be
done by combine minimization formula with maximization
formula in the min-max formulation as done in [2] [4].
We evaluated the studied min-max methods on UNSW-
NB 15 and NSL-KDD datasets of a packet flow, where the
task is to classify packet flow into the correct class. In this
work, we consider some assumptions about our adversarial
threat model. The attacks are evasion attack [5], where an
attacker has access to the IDS models during prediction
time that leads to misclassify the model decision and target
the positive ”attack” sample to be classified as a negative
”benign” sample taking into considerations that a complete
knowledge of the targeted models is known to perform a
white-box attack with multi-iterations.
Fig. 1: Generating adversarial samples by adding small perturbation
to the original malign packet to misclassified as benign packet
B. Adversarial Attack Methods
We use five methods to generate adversarial samples. We
use Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] with a step
gradient update with the direction of the gradient of the loss
function. Basic Iteration method (BIM), which runs multiple
iterations of FGSM and avoid big changes in input features
[7], is the second method. In the third method, we implement
a Projected Gradient Descent attack (PGD), which also
attempts to find the perturbation that maximizes the loss
taking into consideration keep the epsilon perturbation small
enough to lies in the permitted range [3]. We also implement
one of the most effective white-box attacks called Carlini
and Wagner (CW) [8] that defeat defensive distillation and
considered to be used to evaluate the resilience of the po-
tential models. The fifth attack is Deepfool [9] attack that is
designed based on the concept of generalizable, which means
that adversarial samples generated for a particular model can
also fool other models. All listed adversarial attacks were
initially designed and tested on image classification models
[4] [10].
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we highlight the related work for adversar-
ial machine learning with a combination of adversarial attack
methods and defense techniques. In particular, adversarial
attacks in deep learning-based IDS, as shown in Table I.
Some working including [4] [3] [2] [10] utilizing min-
max formulation and deep learning techniques to design
optimal intrusion detection system that can robustly handle
different types of adversarial attacks. In this paper, we
built an experimental prototype based on [2] to incorporate
generated adversarial samples during the training process
and successfully achieve robustness against the adversarial
samples.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
We first train the DNN models in two different phases:
Phase I and Phase II. In Phase I, we first split the two bench-
mark datasets: UNSW-NB 15 and NSD-KDD into training,
testing, and validation sets. We then pre-process the datasets
and apply feature selection using two techniques: PCA and
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE). Experiment results of
applying two feature selection techniques determine which
feature selection method to move forward with the entire
experiments. We then train six baseline deep learning-based
IDSs: ANN, CNN, and RNN on two adversarial-free datasets
to attack them in Phase II by five different types of adver-
sarial samples.
In Phase II, we have conducted various sets of experiments
to generate different adversarial samples: FGSM, BIM, PGD,
CW, and Deepfool using inner-maximizer and evaluate their
effectiveness against the baseline models. In the second part
of Phase II, we evaluate the robustness of the deep learning-
based IDS framework architectures: ANN, CNN, and RNN
that are retrained using Algorithm I.
The adversarial training process based on the min-max ap-
proach is formalized in Algorithm I. The algorithm describes
the IDS framework solution based on min-max formulation
[2]. The deep learning-based IDS framework solution is
illustrated in Fig 2.
All our models were implemented using TensorFlow and
Keras. The experiments were performed on Virtual machine
with GPU acceleration with 32 GB memory and three
Intel core processors 2.294 GHz. For generating adversarial
samples, we use the open-source IBM Robustness Toolbox
(ART) framework [22].
A. Data sets and Pre-processing
In this paper, we use two datasets: UNSW-NB15 [23]
and NSL-KDD [24]. We perform different methods for pre-
processing. Both datasets have different scales and some
significant outliers. To enhance training time and remove
outliers, we re-scale all feature values into a range between
0 and 1. We use an encoder to convert the categorical data
into numbers.
1) UNSW-NB 15 Dataset: It contains nine different at-
tacks, includes DoS, worms, Backdoors, and Fuzzers. In our
experiments, we use binary classification with two classes:
benign and attack labels, and leave the multi-class for further
TABLE I: Machine Learning-based IDS Related Work
Paper Year Algorithms Datasets Adversarial Attacks Defense
Aboukhamis et al. [2] 2019 ANN UNSW-NB 15 FGSM, BGA, BCA min-max approach
Ibitoye et al. [1] 2019 FNN,SNN BoT-IoT FGSM, BIM, PGD Feature Normalization
YePeng et al. [11] 2019 DNN, SVM, RF,LR NSL-KDD FGSM,PGD,L-BFGS,SPSA N/A
Biggio et al. [12] 2013 SVM HTTP-delivered attacks Causative (Poisoning) Attack N/A
Wang et al. [13] 2018 DNN NSL-KDD FGSM,JSMA,Deep fool,CW N/A
Biggio et al. [14] 2011 SpamBayes spam Filter model Lab real traffic Causative (Poisoning) Attack Bagging Ensembles
Homoliak et al. [15] 2018 N Bayes,Log. Reg., D. Tree, SVM ASNM-NPBO Evasion Attack obfuscations-aware classier
Kloft et al. [16] 2010 Support vector data description (SVDD) real HTTP traffic Causative (Poisoning) Attack N/A
Javaid et al. [17] 2016 DNN NSL-KDD N/A N/A
Kwon et al. [18] 2017 DNN Survey KDDCup 1999 N/A N/A
Shone et al. [19] 2018 DNN NSL-KDD N/A N/A
Yin et al. [20] 2017 RNN NSL-KDD N/A N/A
Khalid et al. [21] 2016 Restricted Boltzmann Machine(RBM), Logistic Regression (LR) KDDCup 1999 N/A N/A
Algorithm 1 Experimental Process
Input: Training set, M:inner maximizer
Output: Robust Adversarial trained model, x∗ adv.
samples
Load Train, Validation, Test sets
Extract Important features
Construct ANN, CNN and RNN model C
Define inner-maximization M
Batch← 10
repeat
Read Batch of 32 samples
if Evasion method != Attack-free then
Generate Adv Samples using M(Batch∗)
Start Adversarial Learning (Batch∗)
do Test(Batch∗)
end if
until epoch=10 and C network converged
investigations. Each row in the dataset has 49 features,
including class labels, and it has more than two million
records. We use in our experiments 1,17478 records for
training and 57,863 for testing.
2) NSL-KDD Dataset: It is a new version of the KDD 99
dataset that solves various problems of the KDD 99 dataset. It
has 21 attack types in the training dataset and 37 attacks. We
use binary classification with two classes: benign and attack
label. Our training set consists of approximately 100,778
flow and 25,195 to the testing set.
In all experiments, we tested the adversarially trained
model using new adversarial samples that are not used in
the training time. Using different samples in a testing grantee
that the model evaluated using unseen samples.
B. Architecture Characteristics and Learning Setup
ANN architecture and hyper-parameters listed in Table
II. CNN model built with same architecture and hyper-
parameters for both UNSW and NSL-KDD as listed in Table
III. Table IV has the RNN hyper-parameters.
C. Evaluation Metrics
To understand the robustness of trained models in the
adversarial environment, we use different metrics to evaluate
the performance. Prediction Accuracy (AC): Total number of
correctly classified samples from benign and attack samples
among all number of all samples. Specificity (or Precision):
TABLE II: Training Parameters and Architecture for IDS Models
in ANN Experiments
Parameter Value
No. of hidden layers 3
Layer 1 128 neurons
Layer 2 96 neurons
Layer 3 64 neurons
Dropout 0.25
Optimizer ADAM
Activation function ReLU and Softmax
Learning rate 0.01
Epoch 10
Batch Size 32
TABLE III: Training Parameters and Architecture for IDS Models
in CNN Experiments
Parameter Value
Convolution layer 3 layers with ReLU
Max Pooling 2 layers
Dropout 0.25
Fully Connected 4 layers with ReLU
Output layer Softmax
Optimizer ADAM
Activation function ReLU and Softmax
Learning rate 0.01
Epoch 10
Batch Size 32
TABLE IV: Training Parameters and Architecture for IDS Models
in RNN Experiments
Parameter Value
LSTM layer 2 layers with Sigmoid
Fully Connected 1 layer with ReLU
Dropout 0.5
Output layer Softmax
Optimizer ADAM
Activation function ReLU , Softmax and Sigmoid
Learning rate 0.01
Epoch 10
Batch Size 32
It is a number of true positives among samples classified
as positive. Sensitivity( or Recall): It is called True Positive
Rate (TPR), it is a number of True Positives (TP) among all
positive samples. To evaluate the overall performance of our
binary models among several algorithms, ANN, CNN, RNN,
we utilized a useful metrics called Area Under the Curve
(AUC). It is a number that reflects the model performance.
The best model will have a higher AUC toward 1.
Fig. 2: IDS Framework Architecture with the inner-maximizer that generate adversarial samples and the outer-minimizer that increase
robustness adapted from [2]
V. PHASE I: PERFORMANCE OF ADVERSARIAL-FREE
DEEP LEARNING-BASED IDS
Our objective is to build the most accurate deep learning
model on UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD for each architecture:
ANN, CNN, and RNN as baseline models (benchmarks) to
comprehensively compare the performance of Deep learning-
based IDSs in the adversarial environment in Phases II. We
build six baseline IDSs: ANN-UNSW, ANN-KDD, CNN-
UNSW, CNN-KDD, RNN-UNSW, and RNN-KDD.
A. Feature Selection
In this section, We focus on investigating experimentally
the best feature selection methods that can be applied
to achieve high accuracy and better performance of deep
learning-based IDSs. We use two different selection tech-
niques, Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) and Principal.
1) Performance using RFE: We train the ANN, CNN,
and RNN using RFE feature selection for UNSW and NSD-
KDD. We first selected the top seven features. The experi-
ment was executed multiple times for each DNN algorithms
with different batches and epoch values to obtain the best
accuracy. The accuracy of ANN, CNN, and RNN models on
UNSW-NB and NSL KDD using RFE achieve 88.77% as an
average using the top seven features.
Fig. 3: ANN, CNN and RNN IDSs accuracy for PCA and RFE
2) Performance using PCA: Similarly, with the same
experimental setup and parameters, we train the ANN, CNN,
and RNN using PCA on UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD. We
repeated the experiments three times with different number
principal components 15, 10, and 5. The best accuracy
using PCA achieved by using five principal components, as
shown in Fig 3. The comparison between PCA and RFE is
illustrated in Fig 3. We observe that accuracy with RFE for
all models architectures ANN, CNN, and RNN was higher
than PCA. However, we still did not achieve the efficiency
that we expect. After various tries and observations, we
improve our model performance by selecting the top five
attributes listed in Table V This result might be possible
because we use regularization techniques for prepossessing
the two selected datasets.
TABLE V: The Top 5 selected features from UNSW-NB and NSD-
KDD Datasets UNSW-NB NSD-KDD
protocol service
wrong-fragment dbytes
is-guest rate
same-srv-rate sload
diff-srv-rate dload
B. Baseline IDSs Results
Table VI shows the performance metrics of All baselines
IDSs in adversarial-free environment using the top 5 se-
lected features in Table V. After building and evaluating the
baselines deep learning-based IDS with different algorithms:
ANN, CNN, and RNN on adversarial-free datasets, we are
going to dive into adversarial attacks and defense experi-
ments in the next section.
TABLE VI: Prediction Accuracy, precision, recall for baseline IDSs
Model Accuracy Precision Recall AUC
ANN-UNSW 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.99
ANN-KDD 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.98
CNN-UNSW 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.99
CNN-KDD 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99
RNN-UNSW 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.98
RNN-KDD 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98
VI. PHASE II: EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED DEEP
LEARNING-BASED IDS FRAMEWORK
In Phase II, we report and evaluate the impact of the min-
max approach. We divided Phase II into two parts: Phase
II-1 and Phase II-2.
• In Phase II-1, we start finding adversarial samples from
the selected five adversarial attack methods with high
perturbation using inner-maximizer.
• Evaluate the quality of the adversarial samples found
on UNSW-NB and NSK-KDD datasets generated by
inner-maximizer against the six baseline IDS models,
as shown in Fig 4 and Fig 5 .
• In Phase II-2, we retrain the models with the same
experimental setup in Phase I using Algorithm I.
Fig. 4: Effect of Adversarial samples generated by
inner-maximizer on ANN, CNN and RNN based IDS
trained by Adversarial-free UNSW-NB
Fig. 5: Effect of Adversarial samples generated by
inner-maximizer on ANN, CNN and RNN based IDS
trained by Adversarial-free NSD-KDD
• Evaluate the adversarially trained IDS model robustness
against adversarial samples generated from the same
attack method.
A. Adversarial Attacks Experiments using inner-maximizer
The performance of ANN, CNN, and RNN based IDS in
an adversarial-free environment is evident, as shown in Fig
4 and Fig 5. The performance of deep learning-based IDS in
all three architectures are vulnerable in the adversarial envi-
ronment. Furthermore, Baseline IDS models have different
robustness in UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD experiments. Fig 4
and Fig 5 show a significant decrease in accuracy comparing
to the accuracy in adversarial-free environment. If we look
closer to ANN IDSs and evaluate their performance against
all adversarial samples, we observe that BIM, PGD, and
Deepfool attacks have almost the same effectiveness against
ANN-UNSW and ANN-KDD. However, ANN-UNSW IDS
is more resilient to CW and FGSM attacks, while ANN-KDD
IDS was less resilient against CW attacks.
If we look at CNN-UNSW IDS in Fig 4, we can find that
BIM and PGD attacks are more destructive and decrease the
accuracy by almost 50%. While FGSM, CW, and Deepfool
attacks have less effectiveness on CNN-UNSW IDS. While
in CNN-KDD, CW, PGD, and Deepfool have the same and
higher effectiveness comparing to BIM and FGSM attacks.
For RNN-UNSW IDS, FGSM, CW, BIM, and PGD attacks
have all the same effectiveness. They decrease the initial
accuracy significantly by the half. However, the Deepfool
attack decreases the accuracy outstandingly by almost 85%.
CW attack against RNN-KDD outstanding other attacks. CW
attacks decrease the accuracy sharply by 90%. Fig 5 shows
that all adversarial attacks decrease the accuracy of ANN,
CNN, and RNN baseline IDS sharply. FGSM attack has the
least effectiveness among all ANN, CNN, and RNN models
in NSD-KDD.
Through the comprehensive comparison regarding the
adversarial attacks against baseline IDSs, we can draw the
following findings: FGSM Attack For ANN, CNN, and
RNN models on NSL-KDD and UNSW datasets have less
impact on almost all baseline models because the FGSM
attack’s purpose is to be fast, not optimal attack [8] [6]. We
observe that BIM and PGD attacks have similar effectiveness
in UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD experiments. However, BIM
and PGD effectiveness against CNN-KDD are varying. CW
attack considers the most potent attacks against baseline IDSs
in the NSD-KDD experiments. Although, CW attacks one
if the least effective against baseline IDSs in the UNSW-
NB experiments. FGSM, CW, BIM, and PGD attacks have
relatively effectiveness in the UNSW-NB experiment. As we
observe that the DeepFool attack shows the superiority over
all other attacks expects for CNN-UNSW. Deepfool attack
was considered a very strong attack [9] that can generate
small perturbations to evade deep learning models.
To summarise the UNSW-NB experiment, we observe
that all baselines for ANN, CNN, and RNN IDS trained
by adversarial-free samples are more resilient to the five
adversarial attacks comparing to NSD-KDD experiments.
B. Adversarial Training Experiments using min-max
In Phase II-2, we apply Algorithm I on ANN, CNN,
and RNN to retrain the IDS models with the generated
adversarial samples by inner-maximizer. We then evaluate
the robustness of the defender adversarially trained: ANN,
CNN, and RNN based IDSs on UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD
with unseen adversarial samples. We also compare their
performance to the baseline IDS models that we built in
Phase I.
We built ten adversarially trained models for each ANN,
CNN, and RNN architectures, as shown in Fig 6. In total,
we built 30 adversarially trained IDS models on top of the
six baseline IDS models. We refer to the trained models by
the adversarial attack methods, as shown in Fig 2.
Experimental results on UNSW-NB 15 and NSD-KDD
datasets show a significant improvement in the prediction ac-
curacy of the IDS models among the ANN, CNN, and RNN,
as shown in Fig 6. Figures 6 compare the prediction accuracy
on UNSW-NB and NSD-KDD for all deep learning-based
IDSs before an after applying the min-max approach.
Relatively all adversarial trained models: ANN, CNN, and
RNN trained using Algorithm I lead to high robustness
against the five types of perturbations: FGSM, CW, BIM,
PGD, and Deepfool generated by inner-maximizer. The ad-
versarially trained models are more robust to new adversarial
samples and outperform the baseline IDSs.
However, we observe that the CNN-UNSW IDS trained by
CW samples is less robust to new CW samples comparing to
other adversarial trained models. Also, in RNN-UNSW IDS,
we observe that Deepfool and CW models are less robust
to new adversarial samples from the same attack methods
Fig. 6: Prediction accuracy of ANN, CNN, and RNN before and after applying min-max on NSD-KDD and UNSW-NB 15 Datasets
comparing to other IDS models. This result corresponds to
the nature of CW and Deepfool attacks. [9] [25]. FGSM,
BIM, and PGD models were more robust to their adversarial
samples.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The Novelty of this research derives from the fact that
it is the first experiment to implement and compare dif-
ferent types of architecture, e.g., ANN, CNN, and RNN,
in deep learning-based IDS in an adversarial environment
on two benchmark intrusion detection datasets: UNSW-NB
and NSD-KDD. Most of the literature in the adversarial
domain demonstrated the concept of using one deep learning
architecture with different adversarial attacks. This research
took the path further in investigating and evaluating the
robustness of different types of DNN based IDS against
five adversarial attack methods: FGSM, CW, BIM, PGD,
and Deepfool using the min-max approach. We built 36
Deep learning-based IDS to show that the adversarial train-
ing based min-max approach considers a reliable defense
technique against different adversarial attacks in DNN. For
future work, the aim is to investigate if the min-max approach
in deep learning-based IDS may be considered a general
defense and evaluate further the robustness of adversarial
trained DNN models against multiple adversarial attacks.
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